Shafer v. South Carolina
121 S. Ct. 1263 (2001) by unknown
Capital Defense Journal
Volume 14 | Issue 1 Article 7
Fall 9-1-2001
Shafer v. South Carolina 121 S. Ct. 1263 (2001)
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj
Part of the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons
This Casenote, U.S. Supreme Ct. is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Capital Defense Journal by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Shafer v. South Carolina 121 S. Ct. 1263 (2001), 14 Cap. DEF J. 89 (2001).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj/vol14/iss1/7
Shafer v. South Carolina
121 S. Ct. 1263 (2001)
L Facts
A South Carolina jury found Wesley Aaron Shafer, Jr. ("Shafer") guilty of
murder, attempted armed robbery and criminal conspiracy. After unanimously
finding that a statutoryaggravator was present, the jury recommended the death
penalty, which the judge imposed. During the sentencing phase, the State
presented evidence of Shafer's criminal record, past aggressive conduct, proba-
tion violations, and misbehavior in prison. At an in camera hearing on the jury
instructions, Shafer's counsel argued, relying on Sinnm u Scuth Camibi and due
process, that the jury must be instructed that life means life without the possibil-
ity of parole.2 Shafer's counsel further asserted that the State's introduction of
this evidence put future dangerousness at issue. The judge declined to include
a life means life without parole instruction because, in his opinion, the State had
not argued future dangerousness. The judge further denied Shafer's request to
read the entirety of the applicable statute in his closing.' The State in its closing
repeated several times the words of witnesses to the crime, suggesting that they
were in fear the perpetrators would return, at which point Shafer's counsel
renewed his request for a Sinnm instruction. The judge again denied the
request stating that the State had come close to crossing the line of putting future
dangerousness at issue, but had not. The judge charged the jury that "life
imprisonment means until the death of the defendant."" Shafer's counsel again
objected to the failure to include the statutorylanguage on parole ineligibility, and
the motion was again denied. During deliberations, the jury submitted two
questions to the court regarding parole eligibility.' The judge instructed the jury
1. 512 US. 154 (1994).
2. SeeasoSimmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154,156 (1994) (holding that the juryshould
be instructed life means life without the possibilkyof parole when the defendant is parole ineligible,
future dangerousness is at issue and the jury may only impose life or death as sentencing options).
3. The section which counsel sought to read is: "For purposes of this section,'life imprison-
mert' means until the death of the offender. No person sentenced to life imprisonment pursuant
to this section is eligible for parole..." S.C CODE ANN. S 16-3-20(A) (Law. Co-op Supp. 2000).
4. Shafer v. South Carolina, 121 S. Ct. 1263, 1269 (2001).
5. The specific questions asked by the jury were: "1) Is there any remote chance for
someone convicted of murder to become elig[i]ble for parole? 2) Under what conditions would
someone convicted for murder be elidilble." S/h , 121 S. Ct. at 1269 (alterations in original.
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on parts of the law am but added "[p]arole eligibility or ineligibility is not for
your consideration.'
The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the trial court's decision.
That court held that under South Carolina's new sentencing scheme, Smnm was
inapplicable because three possible sentences are available at the outset of the
sentencing proceedings." The Supreme Court of South Carolina did not address
the question of whether the State had put future dangerousness at issue.' Shafer
sought a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court asserting that
Simm applied to his case because future dangerousness was at issue and once
the jury unanimously found an aggravator only life or death could be imposed.9
II. Hdding
The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that
Simm does apply to South Carolina's new sentencing scheme when future
dangerousness is at issue.") The United States Supreme Court premised its
holding on two bases: (1) the statutory effect of the sentencing scheme; and (2)
jury understanding of parole eligibility or ineligibility." However, the Court
remanded the case to the Supreme Court of South Carolina to determine whether
the State had put future dangerousness at issue. 2
6. Id at 1267-70.
7. The pertinent excerpts of the new sentencing scheme are as follows:
S 16-3-20. Punishment for murder separate sentencing proceeding to determine
whether sentence should be death or life imprisonment.
& A person who is convicted of or pleads ulry to murder must bepunished
by dth, by imprisonment for life, or by a mandatory minimum term of imprison-
ment for thirty years.
(B).. * courtsha c sepate sentencing erodce t astat
a circums tance is found, the defendtant mutDemnea *to elroa
o ionment. If no statutory aggravatung circumstance is found, the defen-
dant must be sentenced to either life imprisonment or a mandatory minimum term
of imprisonment for thirty years.
(C) [If the juryf,,ds a statutory agzravting factor it mayimpose death or life, and
the pLde must gve the sentence which a recommends, as long as it is warmed.]
if t does not unnimousl find any stautoy a ig s or
circumstanes beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall not za a sentencing recommen-
dation. Where a statutoyaggravagingcicumstance is not found, the trial judge shall
sentence the defendant to either life imprisonment or a mandatory minimum term
of imprisonment for thirty years.
S.C CODE ANN. S 16-3-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2000).
8. Sh&r, 121 S. CL at 1270.
9. Id at 1271.
10. Id at 1273, 1275.
11. Id at 1272.
12. Id at 1275.
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III. A nsts /Applhar in Vgina
In discussing the applicability of Sinms, the Court found that while the
statute does permit three sentences to be imposed, its effect, once in the hands
of the jury, only permits life or death." Under South Carolina's sentencing
scheme, the jurymust first unanimouslyfind an aggravator.14 If the jurydoes not
agree upon an aggravator, the judge mayimpose life or a minimum term of thirty
years.1 However, if the jury finds a statutory aggravating circumstance, "the
defendant must be sentenced to either death or life imprisonment." 6 In the
latter instance, the jury does not return to the court before recommending a
sentence."7 The Court examined this process as if it were done in two distinct
phases: a "hypothesized bifurcated sentencing proceeding."" The Court based
this decision on the idea that the jurymade two separate decisions: first, whether
an aggravator was present and second, what sentence to impose1 9 Thus, the
Court concluded: "If the jurors should be told life means no parole in the
hypothesized bifurcated sentencing proceeding, they should be equally well
informed in the actual uninterrupted proceeding."20 The Court's primary con-
cern was whether the jurymayonlychoose between life and death when it nakes
the sentencing decision. Therefore, the United States Supreme Court extended
Sinm to cases in which several sentences may be imposed, but the jury may
choose only between life and death as possible sentences.2
The hold in Sbafer does not have a direct impact in Virginia. Yaib=4
vu C noud held that "the trial court shall instruct the jury that the words
'imprisonment for life' mean 'imprisonment for life without possibility of pa-
role'" where vileness is the aggravating factor.24 Thus, in Virginia, an instruction
on parole ineligibility is required whether or not the Commonwealth puts future
dangerousness at issue. In addition, in the Virginia scheme there is never a third
sentencing option after a capital conviction; the only possibilities are life or
death .2  However, Shr adds emphasis to the idea that the jury must fully
understand the import of its sentencing options.
13. Sw id at 1272-73.
14. Id at 1272.
15. Id at 1273; S. CODE ANN. S 16-3-20(Q (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2000).
16. Id
17. Id
18. Shafl, 121 S. C. at 1273 n.5.
19. Id
20. Id
21. Id at 1273.
22. Swid at 1271-72.
23. 519 S.E2d 602 (Va. 1999).
24. Yarbrough v. Cowmonveakh, 519 S.E2d 602, 616 (Va. 1999).
25. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(A) Mchie 2000).
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The Court, by its decision in this case, has made the constitutionally re-
quired language from Simn more stringent. The instction "life imprison-
ment means until the death of the defendant" is inadequate to satisfy Sinmr -
a court must specifically address parole eligibility or ineligibility.26 Not only did
the United States Supreme Court address the language, but it also emphasized
juryunderstanding."z The Court put a significant amount of weight on the Wuys
qu sOnS, because the questions "left no doubt about [the jurys] failure to gain
r defense counsel's closing argument or the judge's instructions any clear
understanding of what a life sentence means."2" Furthermore the Court criticized
the trial judge's response that the jury should not be concerned with parole
eligibility, because this comment only led to further confusion and the assump-
tion that parole was available.2 Therefore, when a jury makes obvious that it is
confused and concerned about parole eligibility, the court must explain clearly
and plainly that the defendant has no possibilities of being released from prison.
Shgfr provides the means by which a practitioner may argue this point. One
should note that this principle only applies to cases after January 1, 1995. 0
The abilityto introduce prison life evidence as rebuttalto future dangerous-
ness and as mitigation to deter the juryfrom imposing death would be extremely
helpful to most capital defendants. The Supreme Court of Virginia made the
introduction of this evidence virtually impossible with its decisions in Wakerv
Qw7rtwZ-l, 3' ( Or V M,32 and Burn V C&Mmiazlb." The court
held in Waker and Clxrix that prison life evidence was not proper as mitigation
evidence.' In Burm, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that general evidence
of prison life is not relevant rebuttal to the Commonwealth's evidence of future
dangerousness, which is specific bynature. The court also tailored the inquiry
26. Sewgay Shafer v. South Carolina, 121 S. C. 1263 (2001).
27. Id at 1273-74.
28. Id
29. Id at 1274.
30. Sepowraly VA. CODE ANN. S18.2-10(a) (Michie Supp. 2001) (setting punishment for
class one felonies at death or life and a possible fine); VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-165.1 (Michie 1998)
(disallowing parole for felony offenses committed after January 1, 1995); VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-
40.01 (fhice 1998) (allo geriatric conditional release except for class one felony offenses).
Note that before 1995 a defendant with three separate felony convictions of murder, rape or
robberyor anycombination of the these three offenses, was alreadyparoe ineligible. SwVA. CODE
ANN. S 53.1-151 (Michie 1994).
31. 515 S.E2d 565 (Va. 1999).
32. 513 S.E2d 642 (Va. 1999).
33. SeegmmuyWakerv. Conmonweakth 515 SE.2d 565 (Va. 1999); Cherrixv. Common-
weath, 513 SE.2d 642 (Va. 1999) (holding that prison life evidence is not proper mitigation
evidence); Bums v. Commonwealth, 541 SE.2d 872 (Va. 2001) (holding that prison life evidence
is not rebuttal to future dangerousness).
34. Se Wake, 515 S.E.2d at 574; Chvnix, 513 S.EY2d at 654.
35. Bumn, 541 S.E2d at 893.
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of future dangerousness as one of "would," not whether the defendant "could,"
commit future crimes.36
As discussed above, the United States Supreme Court emphasized the
importance of juryunderstanding in Shafer. The opinion focused on the quantita-
tive aspect of a life sentence: a defendant will never be released from prison until
his death. The emphasis the court placed on the juyquatitativelyunderstand-
ing the definition of a life sentence maybe extrapolated to support the argument
that the jurymust also qualitativelyunderstand a life sentence. As the Court said
in Simrn and reiterated in this opinion: "It d[oes] not comport with due
process... to 'secure a death sentence on the ground... of [defendant's] future
dangerousness, while at the same time concealing from the sentencing juryztee
roamg of its [only] noncapital sentencing alternative."'38 The "true meaning" of
the non-capital alternative is life imprisonment. S/ahrdealt specifically with the
"life" aspect of life imprisonment. In fact, the standard Sinmm instruction is
typically called a "life means life" instruction. The jury also needs to know the
"true meaning" of the "imprisonment" aspect of life imprisonment. If jurors are
not informed of what imprisonment means as a qualitative matter, the jury will
speculate about that meaning. A jury which speculates that imprisonment is
qualitatively different from realityis as likelyto react to its speculation bychoos-
ing death over life as is a jury which speculates about whether life means life.
That jurywill be sentencing based on fear rather than reason; sentencing on that
basis is forbidden by Shfr.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Virginia has also expressed concern for
juror clarity in sentencing. The court in Yabn* was concerned with "whether
issues are presented in a manner that could influence the jury to assess a penalty
based upon 'fear rather than reason." 39 In that case, the court was addressing
the fact that when a jury thinks a defendant maybe eligible for parole it is likely
to give a harsher sentence based on this erroneous belief. The Supreme Court
of Virginia states four different times in three pages that the jury must be in-
formed in capital sentencing of its two options to avoid "speculative fears."'
Similarly, in Fis1bzck v Cawmmiad&,41 the Supreme Court of Virginia empha-
sized the harm of jury speculation in sentencing.42 The court in that case em-
phatically stated:
36. Id
37. See Sir, 121 S. C. at 1273.
38. Id at 1272 (quoting Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 US. 154, 162 (1994)) (alterations
in origina) (emphasis added).
39. Yabm#, 519 S.E.2d 602, 613 (quoting Farris v. Commonwealh, 163 S.E2d 575, 576
(Va. 1968)).
40. Idat 613-16.
41. 532 S.E2d 629 (Va. 2000).
42. Fishbackv. Commonwealth, 532 S.E.2d 629,634 (Va. 2000) (holding that juries shallbe
instructed on the possibilities of parole or geriatric release in all felony cases).
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A jury should not be required to perform this critical and difficult
responsibility without the benefit of all sigifirmt and appmnie infor-
mation that would avoid the necessity that it speculate or act upon
misconceptions concerning the effect of its decision. Surelya properly
informed ju rensures a fair trial both to the defendant and the Com-
monwealth.
4
This idea, that jurors may impose a harsher sentence when speculating on
punishment, mayeasilybe extended to prison life evidence. Not onlydo jurors
speculate as to how long a defendant will remain incarcerated, but also what that
incarceration will entail Jurors also speculate about the defendant's enjoyment
of prison life, and in some instances the Commonwealth encourages the juryto
do so. In Sdmit vu Ownuum the Commonwealth, in its closing arguments,
suggested to the jury the "wonderful life" Schmitt would have in prison if the
jurysentenced him to life.4" Thus, to remove all negative speculation, and to be
consistent with Slafe'r, Yxkar and Fithsbk, a defendant should be allowed to
inform the jury of the nature of prison life.
Also, the defendant should be able to introduce prison life evidence in
rebuttal to evidence of future dangerousness. The Supreme Court of Virginia's
decision in Buns was erroneous because its focus on "would" versus "could"
failed to take into account the reality of the societythat a capital defendant faces.
The General Assembly enacted Sections 19.2-264.2 and 192-264.4(C) of the
Virginia Code in 1977.' At that time, (lass 1 felons were eligible for parole and
"society" therefore included both prison and non-prison societies. In 1995,
parole was abolished.47 Thus, after 1995, interpreting "society" to encompass
both prison and non-prison societies results in a conflict between Sections 19.2-
264.2 and 19.2-264.4(Q, on the one hand, and Sections 53.1-165.1 and 53.1-
40.01, on the other. It is a fundamental principle of statutoryinterpretation that
"each statute should receive such a construction as will make it harmonize with
the bodyof law." 48 Therefore, the onlypossible harmonized reading of "society"
in Sections 19.2-264.2 and 19.2-264.4(p, is "prison society."
43. Id at 633 (emphasis added).
44. 547 S.E2d 186 (Va. 20C1Db.
45. Schmitt v. Commonwealth, 547 S.Ed 186, 200 (Va. 20(l) (refusing to address
Schmitt's assignment of error on this point because the motion was untimel).
46. VA. CODE ANN. S19.2-264.2, 192-264.4(Q (Mlchie 1994).
47. VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-165.1 (Mchie 2000) (eliminating parole forall felonyconvictions
after January 1, 1995); VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-40.01 (Michie 2000) (excluding Class 1 felons from
geriatric release).
48. HENRYCAwBELLBLAcK, C)DmTRucnoNANDINTERPRETAnoNoF TE LAWS 60-61
(West Publishing Co. 1896). "The rule is that 'when one statute speaks to a subject in a general way
and another deals with a part of the same subject in a more specific manner, the two should be
harmonized if possible, and where they conflict, the latter prevails." Thomas v. Commonweakh,
419 S.E.2d 606,618 (Va. 1992) (quoting Va. Nat' Bankv. Harris, 257 S.E.2d 867,870 (Va. 1979)).
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The Commonwealth routinelyproves future dangerousness byintroducing
evidence of a defendant's prior convictions or past acts and then asks the juryto
predict a defendant's future conduct when in an environment different from the
unstructured environment in which he committed those acts. Skq er v South
Cmi' 9 held that evidence of prior incarcerations is admissible as both mitigat-
ing and rebuttal evidence for future dangerousness."0 When the defendant asks
to demonstrate to the jury that her past conduct in a known environment corre-
sponds to how she will react in dat san rmner, the evidence should be
admitted. The past and future conditions of incarceration provide a direct
indicator of the defendant's future dangerousness or lack thereof and are,
therefore, more relevant than the Commonwealth's evidence. Future conditions
of incarceration can indicate how the defendant widU behave.
IV. Cairkion
In summary, Sher may be used by the Virginia capital defense lawyer for
two purposes: (1) to ensure that the jury fully understands what a life sentence
means; and (2) when the Commonwealth puts future dangerousness at issue, it
casts a broad umbrella under which evidence of prison life should be admissible.
This argument is important to make because the Ixnrix-Bumr line of cases may
well be found constitutionally deficient and the issue must be preserved."1
Kathryn Roe Eldridge
49. 476 US. 1 (1986).
50. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 US. 1, 8 (1986) (holding that evidence of a defendant's
prior good behavior in prison is admissible as mitigation evidence).
51. Contact the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse for advice and sample motions for the
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